KEEPING UKRAINE OUT OF NATO WILL NOT ADVANCE PEACE WITH RUSSIA

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) “open door” policy toward membership-seeking countries was never intended as an across-the-board policy. It has been implemented on a case-by-case basis, sometimes contingent on opportunities. The acceptance of new member countries has not necessarily been merit-based by NATO’s declared criteria, and undeclared conditions played their role.

The alliance’s open-door policy was not fully insulated from Russia’s nonstatutory blocking power, and NATO-aspirant countries’ path toward membership was not always irreversible. It has been closed when Russia stood forcefully across that path, as in Georgia’s case after 2008 and Ukraine’s after 2014.

Considering the multi-dimensional accretion of power the West could have gained from Ukraine in the post-Soviet era, Ukraine is clearly the most convincing aspirant to NATO membership in terms of its added value. Foreclosing that possibility is what motivated, in part, Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014 and the ensuing low-intensity warfare against it.

The Biden administration officially withdrew US political support for Ukraine’s NATO membership in 2021, joining European naysayers. At NATO’s Vilnius 2023 and Washington 2024 summits, the Biden administration led the way in delaying Ukraine’s membership prospects even further until “conditions are met”—unspecified and without a timeframe—and replacing the unrequited “open door” with a “bridge” metaphor.

Already by 2021, contrary to Moscow’s propaganda, Ukraine found itself farther removed from NATO membership than ever before. That and other concessions emboldened Russia to begin its full-scale invasion and set maximalist political objectives for its war, including further annexations of Ukrainian territories.

Precluding whatever remains of Ukraine from joining NATO is a central war aim for Russia and the core of Russian political settlement proposals.

The incoming Trump administration in the United States and NATO itself face the challenge of overcoming this legacy. The question of post-conflict security guarantees for a territorially reduced Ukraine—whether in NATO or outside of the alliance—figures prominently in numerous unofficial and semi-official proposals.

These proliferated during the 2023 military stalemate in Ukraine when inadequate Western support paved the way for the country’s de facto partition. President-elect Donald Trump is determined to end this war quickly, but his team has yet to outline how.

The only certainty is that they expect European allies to bear the main burdens of guaranteeing Ukraine’s security. The change of administrations in Washington has, therefore, intensified discussions among European NATO members over post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv.

Within NATO, a lowest-common-denominator consensus holds that Ukraine is not eligible for membership while at war with Russia, lest NATO itself be drawn into the war. Some allies would postpone the consideration of Ukrainian membership until “after the war” or pending a “peace” settlement without defining those notions in any way.

Influential voices suggest that Kyiv should join NATO after “freezing” the war along a stable armistice line, de facto accepting Ukraine’s partition, with NATO security guarantees applying de jure to the government-controlled territory only. For their part, Kyiv and supportive governments would effectively prejudge a decision by calling on NATO to invite Ukraine to commence accession talks without further delay, with the actual talks to proceed after an eventual ceasefire.

These various proposals tend to use the terms “end of war,” “peace,” “negotiated settlement,” “armistice,” “ceasefire,” or “freeze” interchangeably. There are no commonly agreed definitions of these concepts among the allies, let alone between them and Russia.

The confusion stems partly from Russia’s hybrid war strategy, which has erased any clear-cut distinctions between peace and war. This can further complicate the attainment of consensus in NATO regarding the prerequisites to Ukraine’s eventual accession.

Nor is “freezing the war” an option to be exercised unilaterally by Ukraine and its NATO partners. A Russia that has prevailed on the battlefield will likely persist with low-intensity warfare against Ukraine even after a “freeze” is declared. It may prepare for “unfreezing” it when convenient, as seen between the 2014–2015 Minsk armistice agreements and the 2022 all-out invasion.

Absent a political consensus in NATO over Ukrainian membership, certain European allies are holding informal consultations about post-conflict security guarantees to Kyiv by NATO members outside of NATO’s framework.

French President Emmanuel Macron initiated this process in February with an informal gathering of European heads of state and governments in Paris, which the Biden administration snubbed by sending an assistant secretary of state. Trump’s election in the United States has helped accelerate those discussions among European allies in various overlapping formats.

Britain, France, Germany, and Poland are the most active participants, while Italy and Nordic countries are also expected to contribute to post-conflict security guarantees for Ukraine. Possible forms of military assistance and defense industry cooperation with Ukraine are also being considered below the level of security guarantees (PAP, November 12, 13; Le Monde, November 25; Die Welt, December 5, 13).

The allies involved are receptive to some of Kyiv’s inputs. Options currently under discussion—all hypothetical at this stage in these formats—include:

• A “coalition of the resolute” to deploy forces to Ukraine as part of a possible armistice package, deterring further Russian attacks;
• Allied troops to enforce an eventual armistice on the Ukrainian side of a demarcation line;
• Non-combat boots on the ground, far from the frontlines, performing logistical and technical assistance tasks to free up the corresponding Ukrainian personnel for frontline combat; and
• Air defenses in allied territory (Poland in this case) to target Russian missiles and drones in certain parts of Ukraine’s air space.

These and other proposals had also been discussed in the run-up to NATO’s Washington summit, but have made no headway thus far. Those options presuppose acting outside NATO’s framework.

Allies willing to consider those options believe, however, that they need to be covered by NATO’s security guarantees to deter and counter possible Russian retaliation. It seems, in this case, that coalitions of the willing venturing outside NATO’s framework cannot, after all, act without NATO’s collective consent.

Bottom line at present. No viable substitute for NATO membership is discernible at this stage for Ukraine, and no alternative for the alliance itself if it is serious about securing Ukraine.

Awaiting a “peace settlement” with Russia before accepting Ukraine into NATO thus encourages Moscow to continue the war indefinitely.

Vladimir Socor is a Romanian-born US citizen. He is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington and lecturer at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, as well as at Harvard University’s National Security Program’s Black Sea Program.