THE BRITISH DISCHARGE AS OF RIGHT—A MODEL FOR AMERICAN SERVICE REFORM?

The U.S. armed forces staff themselves according to a system that has gone mostly unchanged since the Continental Army first appeared.

In this system, an enlisted service member signs on and takes an oath to serve a required amount of time.  After they complete their time, they may be discharged (that is the default) or “re-enlist.”

In the case of officers, they have a commission and may resign after completing a mandatory service obligation.

Officers probably arrive at their first assignment better prepared for it mentally and physically than most enlisted members by virtue of their service academy or ROTC training.

For the enlisted member, who may have signed on for a variety of reasons ranging from the highest (if not theoretical) level of enthusiasm to a dearth of life goals or a personal fable of what to expect, it can be quite different.

It is on these enlisted people we will primarily focus for this article, although the concept could be easily carried over to commissioned officer service.

The outcomes of the young enlisted member trying to adapt to military life can range from the humorous to the macabre as the individual—oftentimes very young and lacking life experience and horizons—seeks to cope.

Some adapt well.  A good number do not.

At Fort Benning, Georgia in the 1980s, the U.S. Army had “firewatches” in their mostly concrete and steel training centers for which the real purpose was to detect suicidal or deserting recruits.

The stories of the outcomes for the latter are featured in news stories, books, or occasionally in films.

A poor decision on the part of the recruit to sign up in the first place can set up a cascade of negative consequences that can follow them for the rest of their lives, as by law and U.S. military culture, a recruit is obligated to stay in until they are somehow able to make it day to day.

It is possible for a recruit to have an entry level separation within six months of joining but this is initiated by the commander, not the recruit, and only for assumed inadequacy to be there.

Good leadership can better the odds for all concerned and even turn the situation around, but oftentimes is lacking—at the upper level for lack of interest, and at the lower because of younger “leaders” who know no way of “leading” other than what they experienced themselves.

Toxic leadership is unfortunately also common and will exacerbate an already bad situation.

Aside from the negative outcomes for the individual, the services spend a distracting amount of time attempting to rehabilitate (or often coerce) the maladaptive member into fitting in at least long enough for their service obligation to expire and for them to exit with other than a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge and a sigh of relief for all concerned.

Hopefully, a war will not break out before this happens.  If it does, a person of questionable commitment will join in the effort with their life at risk and the lives of others at risk depending on their faithful execution of duties or lack thereof.

Although some military traditionalists have held to the idea that an enlistee should remain in the military until a sufficient amount of energy or coercion is brought to bear to “make” them fit, this has obvious potential for abuse, rarely works, and is most unlike the approach in any other line of work or field where high performance is required.

Put simply, if they are a poor fit for the job, getting rid of them is the best choice.

One should ask if there is a way out of this paradigm.

The subject of broad military reforms and a need to move the services in culture and identity from the current model has been and continues to be written about by great and qualified thinkers such as Donald Vandergriff, William S. Lind, and H.J. Poole, and are beyond the scope of this article.

But I would have us focus on one possible way to create better outcomes for service members who join an organization that they really don’t belong in, and for their service.

We could borrow an idea from the British military—and that would be the “Discharge As Of Right.”

It should be stated that the British enlistment system, terms of service, and discharging are, broadly, quite different from the U.S. military’s equivalent.

But in this author’s opinion, the DAOR stands alone in concept from these differences and is aimed specifically at the first-time service member who, for whatever reason, joins the armed forces and, after due consideration early on and some experience, decides it is not for them.

In the Discharge As Of Right, a recruit to the British Armed Forces can, after giving fourteen days’ notice to their commanding officer, be discharged after 28 days of service but before three months of service in the Army and before six months of service in the Navy or Air Force.

An under-18 recruit in the British Army gets up to six months.

Under the British model, service members have different service obligations than are common in the U.S. The minimum length of service in each branch of the forces is as follows:  Army (over 18):  four years.  Army (under 18, you can enlist at age 16):  until 22nd birthday.  Navy:  three and a half years after completion of training or four years’ service, whichever is longer.  Air Force:  three years after completion of training or four years’ service, whichever is longer.

Benefits to the individual and the services from the adaptation of DAOR might include:

1. Fewer service members that stay in when they are uncommitted or unmotivated,
2. Leaders not having to focus time and effort on uncommitted recruits,
3. More transparency and dialogue with both recruits and recruiters regarding what to expect and the suitability of the recruit to be part of the armed forces, to include more front-end vetting. It might be said that the Internet and YouTube have been helping this to some degree.
4. The services having an incentive to treat recruits well during the onboarding process—not necessarily “coddle” them, but move the socialization model to one with more common sense versus blind “tradition.”
5. Inspiring the services to manage their longer-term personnel better, as recruits with the right to discharge could see how members were treated after their ability to DAOR expired, and thus see their own likely future. The cost of keeping toxic leaders and leadership and training practices would become obvious quickly and force changes.
6. Forcing the U.S. government to delineate when the nation is at war versus when it is not. The U.S. military has existed in a perpetual state of war-but-not-war since 1990 thanks to “peacekeeping” and gold-plated efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq that have done little to make the U.S. more secure and much to waste its money and wear down the armed forces from endless deployments and open-ended missions thought of by neocons and liberals, as well.

In addition, DAOR might be supplemented by other companion programs to prevent someone with the wrong goals or mindset from enlisting, such as:

1. Programs allowing potential recruits to spend time with units in garrison to meet serving service members and see what the culture is like and what is expected of them first hand. A bookish, sedentary young man aspiring to be a special operator could benefit from some exposure to the real thing and some eye-to-eye counseling from a real “snake eater.”

Likewise, a disinterested youngster who discovers he can shoot well and enjoys that speed march with a heavy rucksack might find his niche; one can imagine an “indoctrination course” during summer break for this.  Some properly accredited ROTC, reserve, or even a handful of active-duty service members could be had to run this and many eyes would be opened.

2. More “home town” preparatory programs for potential service members. This would include weekend training, mentorship programs with other service members from their city, county, and state, as well as the traditional JROTC programs that are prevalent in Texas but perhaps less so across the country.  These might be administered by the local recruiting offices.
3. Depending on the attrition rates and demands of given service jobs, these programs might be required in order to enlist for those jobs.

Obviously, there would be situations where DAOR would not be possible, such as when war has been declared by Congress.

In that national emergency, the model would have to change and service members who had enlisted (or been drafted) could not be lost in droves at the pleading of family and friends, or fear of death.

But the DAOR could be a valuable tool to ensure a more professional and dedicated operational environment in peacetime for when the military is finally needed.

Mark Deuce has had a life-long career in community law enforcement. He is the author of Deuces Wild for TTP.