OSCE DECLARES ‘DECOLONIZATION OF RUSSIA’ AS NECESSARY FOR PEACE
On July 3, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in a declaration following its recent session in Bucharest, stated that the “decolonization of the Russian Federation is a necessary condition for sustainable peace” (OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, July 3).
That same day, the Russian Federation decided to suspend its participation in the assembly, likely due to this statement (Svoboda, July 3). The declaration also contains the assertion that Russia is pursuing a “policy of genocide” in its war against Ukraine.
These policies include mass killings of civilians during Russian bombings of Ukrainian cities and the forced relocation of Ukrainian children to Russia for their “cultural re-education.”
On the latter, the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova (Icc-cpi.int, March 17, 2023).
Although a legal declaration of genocide can be made and the perpetrator can be subsequently punished, the process of decolonization is more complicated.
Court action cannot be carried out because decolonization is a historical process.
The decolonization of many countries after the world wars of the 20th century was carried out, not by the decision of the League of Nations or the United Nations, but because the population of those countries themselves no longer wanted to remain colonies of former empires.
The decolonization of Russia will be a long process that will require international support to maintain the empire’s fall.
The question of the Kremlin’s colonial policy remains relevant today, and wider discussion of this reality on an international stage is perhaps late.
In 1992, many Western figures hailed the “rebirth of a free Russia” from the ruins of the former Soviet Union (Dimitri K. Simes, After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power, 1999).
They did not notice, however, that this fall was the revival of the empire.
Boris Yeltsin’s Kremlin did not limit itself to the territory of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.
It almost immediately began to impose its military-political influence on other post-Soviet countries, effectively annexing territory, including Transnistria in Moldova and Abkhazia in Georgia (Holod.media, May 5, 2023; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 3, 2023).
These actions differed from Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika when there was talk of a new union treaty between different republics.
In the “new Russia,” voluntary agreements were no longer an option. The goal was only neo-imperial expansion.
In 1992, the Federative Treaty was signed in Russia. The treaty itself, however, was not an equal contractual federation but only a small delegation of powers to the regions granted by the Kremlin (Forbes.ru, March 31, 2015).
The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria refused to sign the treaty so as not to become legally part of the Russian Federation.
Already in 1994, Yeltsin began a colonial war against that republic, sending tanks and bombing peaceful cities, leading to the First Chechen War (Gazeta.ru, May 12, 2017).
The international community did not react strongly enough to this, which gave the Kremlin a free hand for further violence and expansion, virtually without the threat of external consequences.
Putin’s war against Ukraine did not begin “suddenly.” It was the logical result of the neo-imperial evolution of post-Soviet Russia’s politics.
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the topic of Russian decolonization has become more popular.
Numerous analysts have commented on this “new colonialism” and their ideas for decolonizing Russia (The Atlantic, May 27, 2022).
Many analysts, however, still make the mistake of considering Russians to be “colonizers” and non-Russian peoples to be “colonized.”
In this argument, the ethnic factor is overexaggerated and could cause conflict.
In today’s Russia, about 80 percent of the population labels themselves as ethnically Russian on the census.
Thus, Russia’s future will inevitably depend on their opinion and not just on the 20 percent of various national minorities (see EDM, January 10, 2023; Rosstat, accessed July 17).
All ethnic Russians cannot be labeled as colonialists since Russian oblasts are the same colonies of Moscow as the national republics (AIF.ru, June 16, 2022).
In the republics, however, colonialism is experienced more strongly since it is accompanied by the suppression of local languages and cultures.
This is precisely the imperial policy of the Kremlin (Yesli by tochnym, July 21, 2023).
The ethnic Russians themselves in various regions of Russia are not at all some kind of “political monolith.” Today, imperial propaganda is trying to portray them as such.
Still, the inhabitants, for example, of the Baltic exclave of Königsberg, now known as Kaliningrad, and the Pacific Vladivostok, in their geographical worldview, differ approximately like Canadians and New Zealanders, though they speak the same language.
Alexander Etkind, professor at the European University Institute, in his book Internal Colonization: Russia’s Imperial Experience proves that colonial policy began in 12th century and was developed into the 15th century with the doctrine of “gathering lands around Moscow.”
Moreover, the first victims of Muscovite colonialism were not other ethnic groups, but the Russian independent principalities of Tver, Ryazan, and Novgorod, among others.
This hyper-centralist policy continues today in which Moscow monopolistically broadcasts “on behalf of all Russians” (Region.expert, April 5, 2017.
See for example, Putin’s recent push to refer to everyone in Russia as the Russian word “russkiye,” ethnic Russians.
The Kremlin has a habit of turning everything upside down to fit its own narrative (like Democrats in the US?).
Today, it accuses Western countries of “colonialism” while ignoring how its own empire was built on Moscow’s typical colonial plunder of Russia’s regions (Er.ru, March 6, 2023).
Vasily Fomin, an economist from the Republic of Karelia, argues that real decolonization of Russia can only begin with the elimination of Moscow’s economic hyper-centralism, in which the majority of resources and taxes from all regions go to the capital (Region.expert, March 31, 2023).
This cannot happen with ethnic slogans for decolonization, however.
Today, no matter how paradoxical it may seem, many supporters of non-Russian ethnic cultures support the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine (Severreal.org, May 26, 2022; see EDM, January 18).
An ethnic interpretation of decolonization, for example, “non-Russians against Russians,” could upend any chances for a “sustainable peace,” as the OSCE declaration promises.
Such an approach could produce exactly the opposite—namely, the spreading of war and instability throughout Eurasia.
Therefore, some Western politicians’ caution about the slogan “the collapse of Russia” is quite understandable.
Alternatively, Western politicians could support democratic self-government in Russia’s regions and hold truly free elections there.
They could demand that Russia adhere to the principles of the federation since it retains this official name.
However, the question of how to properly implement this process remains unanswered.
The solution of how to implement these types of policies is a common problem with all OSCE resolutions—they can be as correct and helpful as you like, but there is no mechanism for their implementation if the Kremlin objects.
Today, supporters of Russia’s decolonization seem to be waiting for the eleventh hour, when Ukraine wins and the Kremlin regime begins to crumble.
However, any “freezing” of the conflict along the current frontlines will inevitably postpone the task of decolonizing Russia once again.
Vadim Shtepa is the editor-in-chief of Region.Expert. the only independent media outlet on Russian regionalism and federalism. He graduated from the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University (1992) and Moscow School of Political Studies (2012). He is also an alumnus of the Research Course on American Federalism (University of Missouri, St. Louis, USA, 2013). Mr. Shtepa is the author of three books on the history and philosophy of Russian regionalism. Since 2015, he has been living in Estonia due to persecution in Russia for his political views.